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ABSTRACT: This paper studies communication and information sharing in teams, where agents work 
under conditions of moral hazard in a correlated environment, production is jointly determined, and 
performance is evaluated jointly. One agent has private access to pre-decision productivity information, 
which can be shared with the uninformed agent either formally through the accounting system by directly 
communicating to the principal who then discloses the information, or informally by signaling through his 
action. The principal always prefers information sharing to no information sharing, even though 
communication does not result in reduced pay of the informed agent, but rather improves the uninformed 
agent’s productive choices. However, it may be less costly if both agents are uninformed, depending on 
the states of productivity and the mode information sharing. Further, neither type of information sharing 
dominates and the optimal mode of information sharing also depends on the states of productivity. With 
direct information sharing, the principal can tailor the uniformed agent’s payments to the actual state, just 
as if the information was public, but the informed agent earns more rents. The downside to indirect 
information sharing is that the principal remains uniformed, but the advantage is that the informed agent’s 
payment is lower due to the effect of the uninformed agent’s actions. The normally strong team incentives 
are decreased for the informed agent, which results in lower payments.  
 
 
Keywords: principal-agent theory, teams, asymmetric information, communication, information sharing 
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies communication and information sharing in teams, where 
asymmetrically informed agents work in a correlated environment, production is jointly 
determined, and performance is evaluated jointly. With one agent informed, the question of 
communication and information sharing is pertinent. Communicating information either involves 
directly reporting the information formally through the accounting system, or indirectly reporting 
by credibly signaling the information through actions. While accounting is concerned with 
verifiable, hard reporting, it is important to consider alternative modes of communicating 
information. Another significant element is to whom the information is communicated, whether 
to upper-level employees who design contracts, or to peer-level employees, who are members of 
a team and whose production affects the entire team. This paper considers two approaches of how 
to communicate information, both direct reporting, which means information is first reported to 
the principal and then shared with the uninformed agent and indirect reporting, where information 
is signaled to the other agent, rather than communicated to the principal.  
An important function of accounting systems involves formal reporting of information, 
both within and outside of the organization. While this paper focuses on dissemination of 
information within the firm, externally disclosed information can depend on the internal 
information disclosure system. For instance, Apple maintains a culture of secrecy and limited 
communication not only externally with its competitors, suppliers, and customers, but also 
internally with its own employees (Stone and Vance, 2009; Wingfield, 2006). 1  Further, 
information dissemination is considered an important organizational design variable (Simons, 
1995; Pfeffer, 2007). More specifically, open communication and sharing information among 
team members are often viewed as being vital components of a team’s success (Levi, 2001; 
                                                
1 At Apple, employees are also often just as surprised as outsiders at new product launches. In order to enforce secrecy 
inside Apple, employees are subject to strict controls, including constant monitoring by security cameras, while 
employees working on product testing must keep devices covered up. (Stone and Vance, 2009). 
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Katzenbach and Smith, 1993). However, these proponents ignore the effect of different types of 
communication on incentives and performance pay, which all agree is also an important 
consideration of a team’s success. This paper focuses on the incentive effect of communication 
and sharing of pre-decision, productivity information that affects agents’ productive choices. 
Prior work on communication in models of moral hazard focuses on single-agent settings, 
and is hard pressed to find strict benefits of communication (Lambert, 2001; Christensen and 
Feltham, 2005). 2  In a single-agent setting, the only value in communication is in reducing 
payments due to lower risk premiums; however, the incentives needed for communication can be 
too strong and the value lost. In a team setting, the advantage is that communication from one 
team member can be valuable not because it reduces the team bonus for that team member, but 
because it is informative about the team’s productive environment and can be used to share 
information with uninformed team members, improving productive decisions.  
I use a principal multi-agent model, with two risk neutral agents with limited liability 
who work in a correlated environment. The reason to use risk neutral agents is to focus on the 
incentives related to communication and information sharing, rather than risk effects. Only a 
group (i.e. aggregate) measure of performance is observed and each agent’s individual output is 
indistinguishable. The team output depends on each agent’s productive act and a random, but 
common, state of productivity, except in the highest state where output is high regardless of the 
agents’ effort, so no effort is the efficient production plan in this state. An example of the type of 
production considered here is an assembly line production, where workers are assigned a task, the 
productivity environment is common, and output is attributed to all of the workers. Or it could 
refer to an even more specific situation where a team works on a single project together, such as 
with product development or problem-solving teams. Another alternative is to consider a broader 
                                                
2 Communication is a key element of capital budgeting models that incorporate principal-agent problems (see Antle and 
Fellingham, 1997 for a review). In these settings, the agent has private information and an incentive to misrepresent his 
information, but this work differs from a moral hazard setting because the agent takes no productive action and here the 
efficient action depends on the agent’s information.   
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context where the entire firm is viewed as a team as in Alchian and Demsetz, (1972), or as E. 
Lazear declares, “firm production is team production” (p. 338, Lazear, 1998). What is meant is 
that firms organize as firms precisely to take advantage of benefits from workers working under 
one roof, in a correlated environment. Individuals in a firm are not working in isolation. 
One agent has private access to an information system that provides an early, pre-
decision signal about the state of productivity. An agent’s access to the productivity signal allows 
him to tailor his productive action to the state more efficiently than if he did not have access to 
the signal. However, the principal must provide stronger incentives based on the agent’s 
knowledge of the productivity state than if the agent were uninformed about the productivity 
state. With only one agent informed and one agent uninformed, I consider not only 
communication between the principal and the informed agent, but also two ways of sharing the 
productivity information with the uninformed agent. First, I consider the case where the informed 
agent communicates directly to the principal, who publicly releases the information to the 
uninformed agent, via a hard, verifiable report (it can be verified with the informed agent’s 
report). The second option is that communication with the principal is bypassed and the informed 
agent partially signals his information through his effort choice, which is observed by the 
uninformed agent prior to choosing his effort. I do not consider direct communication between 
the agents because the uninformed agent will ignore it due to its lack of credibility.  
There are two main results. The first concerns the benefits of communication and 
information sharing. With no information sharing, communication has no strict value because in 
order to provide incentives for the agent to report truthfully, the principal must pay a bonus that 
does not depend on the communication, thus negating any positive result of the communication 
on its own. If the principal can share the information with the uninformed agent, then 
communication and information sharing are valuable because it improves the uninformed agent’s 
productive choices without being too costly. Even if the information is not communicated to the 
principal, but instead is signaled from the informed agent to the uninformed agent, the principal 
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also prefers that the informed agent share his information with the uninformed agent prior to 
taking his action in order to improve the uninformed agent’s productive choices. In addition, 
signaling has another benefit over no information sharing: it reduces the rents of the informed 
agent because of the effect of the uninformed agent’s actions on the informed agent’s incentives. 
The normal team incentives provide an incentive to work given the other agent is working, but 
with signaling these incentives are unnecessary. If the informed agent does not work hard, then 
the uninformed agent will also choose not to work hard. Thus the payment to the informed agent 
is lower than payments in the normal team setting with no information sharing. 
A related question to the benefits of information sharing is whether or not both agents 
should be restricted from accessing the production information. As mentioned previously, Apple 
maintains strict secrecy among its employees, while Whole Foods, whose organizational design 
relies heavily on teams, shares all financial information with its employees (Fishman, 1996). 
Despite the benefits of information sharing with one informed agent, the principal may prefer that 
both agents are uninformed. This is due to the rents that the informed agent earns. In order to 
provide incentives to the informed agent to work hard given his private information, the principal 
must overpay in the more productive states. Making the agents uninformed reduces the rents in 
the higher productive states, but the agents work hard in all three states. Even with the productive 
inefficiencies, if the informed agent’s information rents are high enough, then the principal will 
prefer that both agents are uninformed.  
The second main result concerns the optimal mode of information sharing. I consider 
whether using the accounting system to disseminate information or whether informal signaling 
between the agents is more efficient. Of the two modes of information sharing, surprisingly the 
use of the accounting system in providing full disclosure does not dominate partial, informal 
signaling of information. There are several tradeoffs between the two types of information 
sharing. First, with direct information sharing, the informed agent earns higher rents than with 
signaling. With signaling, because of the effect of the uninformed agent’s actions on the 
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incentives for the informed agent, the payment is lower. Second, the expected payments for the 
uninformed agent may be higher or lower with direct information sharing. Regardless of whether 
the uninformed agent is informed via the principal’s public release of information or indirectly by 
observing the informed agent’s action, the agent makes the most efficient productive decisions. 
With direct disclosure, the principal is informed and provides state-by-state incentives to work 
hard, rather than incentives based on the expected productivity. With indirect information 
sharing, the principal remains uninformed, and so does not direct the uninformed agent, state-by-
state, but rather makes a payment based on the average productivity in the two productive states. 
The uninformed agent’s expected payments may less with signaling than with direct disclosure; 
in the high state and in the intermediate state, the expected pay is more with signaling but in the 
low state it is less than with signaling. Overall, signaling is preferred as long as there is either no 
cost or a low cost with the uninformed agent. 
This paper is related to several streams of research. First, and foremost is the literature on 
communication of private, pre-decision information with a single, risk-averse agent, which started 
with Christensen (1981), who considers communication but whose focus is on demonstrating that 
the principal is not always better off with an informed agent. This work was followed by Baiman 
and Evans (1983) and Penno (1984), who study the value of communication when the agent has 
private, pre-decision information. In this work, communication is valuable because of improved 
risk sharing. This paper extends this literature by considering a multi-agent team setting, which 
allows for study of additional modes of communication, but abstracts away from risk-sharing 
considerations by focusing on risk-neutral parties. Melumad and Reichelstein (1989) also abstract 
away from risk-sharing and with a single, risk neutral agent with pre-contract information show 
that communication can be valuable because of either improved action choice or lower 
informational rents as long as the performance measure is coarse enough compared to the agent’s 
information and action choice. 
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This paper is also related to the team literature that considers communication but focuses 
on collusive agreements among agents, rather than on conveying productivity information that 
affects compensation (Laffont and Martimort, 1997; Tirole, 1992). Also related is the collusion 
literature, including Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990), Itoh (1992 and 1993), Ramakrishnan and 
Thakor (1991), and Varian (1990). In this work, the benefit of agents’ ability to observe other 
agents’ efforts comes agents’ ability to commit to side payments and which induce more 
cooperation and improved risk sharing. In contrast, in this paper, I do not assume that agents can 
commit to side contracting and the benefit of observing the other agent’s effort is due to 
information credibly conveyed in the agent’s action. 
Other work that has studied the question of agents’ access to private, pre-decision 
information include Baiman and Sivaramakrishnan (1991), Bushman et al. (2000), who restrict 
communication from a privately informed, risk averse agent and demonstrate the value of agent’s 
information. A recent paper that studies imprecise pre-decision information is Rajan and Sauoma 
(2006) who demonstrate that in a single agent, multi-task setting where the agent is privately 
informed and able to communicate, the principal prefers that the agent be either perfectly 
informed or perfectly uninformed. All of this work is based on a single-agent setting, while this 
paper expands the setting to include multiple agents working in a correlated environment, and 
where agents are not symmetrically informed.  
2. Model 
The model consists of a risk neutral principal and two risk neutral agents, 1 and 2, who have 
limited liability. Each agent contributes unobservable, costly effort to a team project. The agent’s 
effort can be high or low, e ∈ {0, 1}, and has a cost ce, where c > 0. Agent i’ s individual output, 
xi is also binary and can be good (xi = H) or bad (xi = L). The probability distribution of xi depends 
on agent i’s choice of effort as well as a common shock, θn, n ∈ {L, M, H}, with each state 
equally likely.  
 7 
Under the most favorable shock, θH, the output of both agents will be high, regardless of their 
effort, while under θM and θL, the likelihood that an agent will produce the high output depends 
only on that agent’s effort. With θM, the probability that agent i produces output xi = H is p1 if he 
chooses high effort and p0 if he chooses low effort, with p1 > p0. With θL, the probability that 
agent i produces output xi = H is q1 if he chooses high effort and q0 if he chooses low effort, with 
q1 > q0. Thus, if agent i works hard, the probability that xi = H is 1/3(1 + p1 + q1) and if agent i 
shirks, 1/3(1 + p0 + q0). In the states where effort is productive, assume that p1 ≥ q1 and p0 ≥ q0, 
which means that θM is a more productive state than θL. Also, assume that in the intermediate 
state, marginal productivity is higher than in the low state, or p1 - p0 > q1 - q0 > 0.  3 
The informed agent directly observes the productivity state, and that information can be 
shared with the uninformed agent in two ways. One method, which I refer to as direct information 
sharing, involves public disclosure of the information from the principal. In this case, the 
informed agent reports the information directly to the principal, who then releases the agent’s 
information to the uninformed agent in the form of a verifiable report. The disclosure takes place 
early, before the agents have chosen their actions. The second method involves no direct 
communication between the informed agent and the principal, but rather indirect communication 
between agents. I refer to this as indirect information sharing. In this case, the informed agent 
signals his information through his choice of effort to the uninformed agent. Because the 
informed agent communicates his information through his effort to the uninformed agent, he 
cannot communicate complete information but can only indicate whether or not he observed the 
high state θH.  
                                                
3 While the high productivity state is more productive than the intermediate and low productivity states, the setup 
creates a non-monotonic relationship in terms of marginal productivity. However, this is exactly the setting where 
productive efficiency is important; if agents work hard, it is not only costly to the agents, but it is also costly to the 
principal, making information sharing an important consideration. 
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The timeline is as follows. Given the information system, the principal offers each agent a 
contract, which each agent may reject in which case the game ends, or the agents accept the 
contract and join the firm. Nature determines the value of θ. The informed agent privately 
observes the state, which may be reported privately to the principal, and if so, is denoted by !ˆ . 
The informed agent then chooses his effort, eInf. Next, the principal may release the report to the 
uniformed agent, who then chooses his effort eUnInf. Alternatively, the informed agent does not 
report his information to the principal, but the uninformed agent observes the informed agent’s 
effort. Finally the performance evaluation system produces a performance measure of the team’s 
production.  
The control system produces an aggregate (i.e. team) performance measure of the project, x = 
x1 + x2 which can be high, medium, or low, and which is available for contracting. A high team 
output (xH) means that x1 = x2 = H, medium output (xM) means either x1 = H and x2 = L or x1 = L 
and x2 = H, and low team output (xL) is when x1 = x2 = L. The principal uses the performance 
measure produced by the control system and any communication from the informed agent on 
which to base payments to the agents. With communication, the payment to the informed agent 
depends on the team’s output, xj, as well as the informed agent’s communication and is denoted 
by wjInf (!ˆn ) , j, n = L, M, H. Also letwi ( !ˆn ) ≡ [wHi (!ˆn ) ,wMi (!ˆn ) ,wLi (!ˆn ) ] denote the vector of 
payments to agent i, given the report !ˆn , n = L, M, H. Let pr( 
x j !n ,e
1,e2 ) denote the probability 
of team output, j = L, M, H, given the state θn, n = L, M, H and given both agents’ choice of 
effort. Throughout the paper, I assume that work is sufficiently valued by the principal, so that 
with information about θ, the principal wishes the agents to work hard only when the states are θM 
and θL.  
The principal’s problem with one informed agent and communication but no information 
sharing, Program PI,U as shown below, is to minimize expected payments to the agent, subject to 
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the agent’s participation (individual rationality, IR) constraints that ensure the agent will at least 
earn his reservation wage, which I normalize to zero. The incentive compatibility constraints 
ensure the agent prefers high effort to low effort and reports the information truthfully. From the 
Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1979), I restrict my analysis to truthful reporting. The first set of 
incentive compatibility constraints (IC1- Inf) is for the state θH and ensures that the agent reports 
truthfully and chooses low effort. The second set of incentive compatibility constraints (IC2-Inf) 
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The principal’s problem with the uninformed agent depends on whether or not information is 
shared, and if it is shared, the method of information sharing. The specific programs are specified 
in subsequent sections. 
3. Analysis 
3.1 Benchmark – Public Information 
In this section, the principal and both agents observe the productivity state so that all 
parties are informed. With an informed principal, communication from the agents is redundant. 
The reason to consider public information as a benchmark is because when an agent is privately 
informed, inefficiencies arise due to overpayment and having to provide incentives to the agent 
based on his private information. In the case of uninformed agents, there are additional 
inefficiencies related to misallocated effort, when agents work hard in the high productive state, 
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even though output is the same, regardless of effort. Understanding the role communication and 
information sharing entails being able to compare it to when the principal is also informed.  
An informed principal’s problem is similar to when the agents are privately informed and 
report their information, except that the truth-telling constraints are not necessary and !ˆ , the 
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The solution is for both incentive constraints to be binding. The optimal contract is as 
follows. Under θH, the principal will pay the agents nothing because in the high productivity state, 
the agents always achieve the high outcome even without working hard. However, under θM or θL 
the principal wants the agents to work hard. Payments under the optimal contract are wi (θH) = (0, 
0, 0), wi (θM) = (
 
c
p1( p1! p0 )















With the principal informed about productivity, payments can be based not only on the 
team’s output, but can also be tailored specifically to the productivity state. If the high 
productivity state occurs, then the payment is zero, because the principal does not want the agents 
to work hard. If the state is either θL or θM, then the principal makes a payment only if the entire 
                                                
4 With teams, tacit collusion among agents may be a problem. In the agents’ subgames, one for each productivity state, 
where both agents choose effort simultaneously given the contract payments, because the incentive constraint is 
binding, one agent will be indifferent between working hard and shirking, given the other agent is working hard. A 
second equilibrium is when both agents choose low effort. However, the equilibrium with both agents working 
dominates the shirking equilibrium. Thus, tacit collusion among the agents is not a problem in this setting. See Demski, 
et al (1988) for analysis of the tacit collusion problem with multi-agents who are risk neutral and have limited liability. 
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team is successful, so the payment can be interpreted as a bonus, but the amount of the bonus 
depends on the specific state. These payments are tailored to the state, in that the payment 
depends inversely on the marginal productivity of the state. The state with a higher marginal 
productivity is easier to control (and thus payment is lower) than one with a lower marginal 
productivity, because working hard in the more productive state means the team is more likely to 
be successful compared to the state with lower marginal productivity, where it is harder to 
produce the high output.  
In the following sections, I consider communication and information sharing when only 
one agent is privately informed. With the principal uninformed, generally the payments can only 
be based on the output and not the signal of the productivity state. However, with communication, 
the payments can also be based on the agent’s report of the productivity signal. In addition, with 
only one agent informed with pre-decision information, the principal must design different 
incentives than if the agent is uninformed.  
3.2 Private Information 
In this section, the productivity state is not publicly observed by the principal and both 
agents, but rather the informed agent privately observes the state prior to making his effort 
choice. I first analyze the case where there is no information sharing, with both agents 
uninformed and then with just one agent privately informed. This helps establish the basis for 
understanding the effect of communication between the informed agent and the principal, as well 
as for sharing information with the uninformed agent. 
3.2.1 No Information Sharing  
In this section, I first analyze the case where both agents are uninformed and then I 
consider asymmetrically informed agents, where one agent is informed and directly 
communicates to the principal but the principal does not release the information to the 
uninformed agent. The reason to start with no information sharing is to establish that 
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communication is not beneficial unless it can be disseminated to the uninformed agent and used 
in contracting with the uninformed agent.  
With both agents uninformed, the principal motivates the agents to always work hard. 
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p1( p1! p0 )+ q1(q1!q0 )
.  
Compared to the setting where the productivity information is public, there are two 
primary inefficiencies. First, agents work hard in all three states, which leads to an increased 
payment, ex ante, due to the inefficiency. Because agents are uninformed, the payment is based 
on the average of the marginal productivity of all three states, which must be high enough to 
cover the expected cost of working hard and must motivate each agent to work hard given the 
other agent is working hard. Second, the payments cannot be tailored to the state, which results in 
overpayment not only in the high state (θH), where agents will definitely produce the high output 
and where the efficient payment is zero, but also in the intermediate state (θM), and possibly in the 
low state (θL), depending on how the states vary. Improving the agents’ productive decisions by 
providing information about the productivity state will reduce the cost of working hard, but there 
are incentive costs from privately informed agents that may outweigh this benefit, and which I 
consider next.   
Next I consider the case with one agent who is informed and who communicates to the 
principal, but there is no information sharing. With no information sharing, the principal does not 
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share the informed agent’s report with the uninformed agent, nor does the informed agent 
indirectly communicate with the other agent. Agents choose their effort simultaneously. 
Incentives for the agents differ not only because of the difference in information at the time of 
choosing productive effort, but also because the informed agent makes more efficient productive 
choices and incurs a lower cost of working hard than the uninformed agent. The uninformed 
agent’s expected payment depends only on the team’s output, and is denoted  wj
UnInf , j = L, M, H. 
The principal’s problem with one informed agent and only direct communication between the 
informed agent and the principal is to solve Program PI, U for the informed agent, but the 
principal’s problem with the uniformed agent and no information sharing is as follows: 
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UnInf ]   (IC-UnInf) 
There is one difference regarding the uninformed agent between the program with one 
uninformed agent, PU,I, and the program above with both agents uninformed, PU,U. The 
uninformed agent will work hard in all three states, as when both agents are uninformed, but here 
the informed agent will not work hard in the high productivity state. However, this does not affect 
expected output in the high state. For the uninformed agent, the solution involves a binding 
incentive constraint, with payments, wUnInf = (
 
3c
p1( p1! p0 )+ q1(q1!q0 )
, 0, 0). The payment 
reflects the agent’s lack of information about the productivity state and is a weighted average of 
the marginal productivity of all the states, the same as when both agents are uninformed. For the 
informed agent, determining payments is more complex. 
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Starting with the incentive constraints when the agent observes the low state, θL, one 
binding constraint is IC2, which provides incentives to work hard and tell the truth. First, the 
constraint with truthtelling and working hard is binding, or 
 
pr(x j / !L ;1,1)wj
Inf (!ˆL )
j
! – c = 
 
pr(x j / !L ;0,1)wj
Inf (!ˆL )
j
! , which implies wInf( !ˆL ) = (
c
q1(q1 ! q0 )
, 0, 0). The uninformed principal 
must at least pay the agent based on the low productivity signal (which translates to the higher 
payment of the two productive states), in order to motivate the agent to work hard. In order to 
provide incentives to communicate truthfully, the other incentive constraints (IC2) must also hold, 
or 
 
pr(x j / !L ;1,1)wj
Inf (!ˆL )
j
! – c ≥ 
 





pr(x j / !L ;1,1)wj
Inf (!ˆL )
j
!  ≥ 
 
pr(x j / !L ;1,1)wj
Inf (!ˆr )
j
! , r = M, H. The worst case would be the same as no communication, 
where the payments are the same regardless of the report, or wInf( !ˆL ) = w
Inf( !ˆM ) = w





, 0, 0). In that case, all of the constraints would also be binding, or 
 
pr(x j / !M ;1,1)wj
Inf (!ˆM )
j
! - c = 
 
pr(x j / !M ;0,1)wj
Inf (!ˆr )
j
!  = 
 
pr(x j / !M ;1,1)wj
Inf (!ˆr )
j
! - c, r = L, 
H. However, it may be possible that there is a solution in terms of wInf( !ˆH ) or w
Inf( !ˆM ) that 
differs from the no communication case. 
Turning to the incentive constraints when the agent observes the intermediate state, θM, 
the incentive constraint that motivates hard work and truthful reporting will not be binding, or 
pr(x j /!M ;1,1)
j
" wjInf (!ˆM )  - c > pr(x j /!M ;0,1)
j
" wjInf (!ˆM ) . The reason is that if it is binding, 
because of the higher marginal productivity, the payment will be so low that the agent will want 
to report θL instead of θM or pr(x j /!M ;1,1)
j
" wjInf (!ˆM )  - c < pr(x j /!M ;0,1)
j
" wjInf (!ˆL ) . So, then 
there are two sets of constraints remaining for the high signal, θM:  
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pr(x j /!M ;1,1)
j
" wjInf (!ˆM )  - c ≥ pr(x j /!H ;0,1)
j
" wjInf (!ˆr ) , r = L, H (1) 
pr(x j /!M ;1,1)
j
" wjInf (!ˆM )  - c ≥ pr(x j /!H ;1,1)
j
" wjInf (!ˆr )  - c, r = L, H  (2) 
Given the solution for the state θL and the payments wInf( !ˆL ), when the agent observes 
the higher productivity state θM, because of the higher productivity and the higher payment, the 
agent will want to work hard and report !ˆL rather than not work hard and report !ˆL . Technically, 
for r = L, this means that the right-hand side of (2) is as least as big as the right-hand side of (1), 
or pr(x j /!M ;1,1)
j
" wjInf (!ˆL ) - c > pr(x j /!M ;0,1)
j
" wjInf (!ˆL ) , which is true, given the payments 
wInf( !ˆL ). If the IC is binding for r = L with high effort, then the payments for the reported state 
θM will be the same as when the agent reports θL, or wInf( !ˆM ) = w




, 0, 0). 
Similar logic can be applied to reporting !ˆH , however, here the problem may be that the agent 
will not want to work hard and report !ˆH , but this depends on the payments for the report of !ˆH , 
which I turn to next.  
Finally, the constraints for the high signal, θH, ensure that the agent does not work hard, 
but reports truthfully instead of reporting θM or θL. In order to ensure truthful reporting of the 
signal θH the principal must pay the agent the higher of the two payments, wHInf (!ˆL )  or wHInf (!ˆM ) . 
However, wHInf (!ˆL )  = wHInf (!ˆM ) , so in order to promote truthful reporting, wHInf (!ˆH )= wHInf (!ˆM )  = 
wHInf (!ˆL )  = wHInf .  
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To summarize, the optimal contract is wInf( !ˆH ) = w
Inf( !ˆM ) = w





0), wUnInf = (
 
3c
p1( p1! p0 )+ q1(q1!q0 )
, 0, 0), and the expected cost is = 
(1+ p12 + q12 )
3 (wH
Inf  + 
wHUnInf ). 
Compared to the public information setting, the informed agent earns information rents in 
the high and the intermediate productive states. Because the informed agent’s payment must be 
high enough to induce work in both productive states and to communicate truthfully, it is based 
on the marginal productivity of the low productive state. Even though the informed agent’s effort 
choice is efficient, the payment is higher than if the information was public. With the uninformed 
agent and no information sharing, the inefficiencies are the same as above when both agents are 
uninformed. The uninformed agent works hard in all three states, and is overpaid in order to 
induce high effort.  
In addition, with no benefit from communication, the inefficiencies from having one 
agent informed might be more than if both agents are uninformed, as stated in the following 
proposition.  
Proposition 1: With one agent informed and no information sharing, communication is never 









* where y  = p1 – p0, and z = q1 – q0. 
Proof: All proofs in the Appendix. 
If information is not shared with the uninformed agent, then communication is not strictly 
valuable to the principal. The lack of value in communication with no information sharing can be 
reconciled with findings of prior work of communication with single, risk-averse agent settings 
(Lambert, 2001; Christensen and Feltham, 2005; Penno, 1984). In that work, communication is 
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only valuable because of a risk reduction in the non-productive states. In the productive states, 
communication is not valuable because the truth-telling constraints imply that the agent’s 
expected utility must be independent of the communication. With risk-neutral agents, there is no 
possibility and therefore no benefit to reducing risk in the non-productive state of θH. With no 
benefit to communication, the proposition also demonstrates that the principal may prefer that 
both agents are uninformed. 
The reason that the principal may prefer agents are uninformed, has to do with 
differences in expected payments for both the informed agent and the uninformed teammate. 
With the informed agent, the payment is based on the marginal productivity of the low state, and 
regardless of his information, the informed agent is paid the bonus in all three states, just like the 
uninformed agent. Yet whether the informed agent’s payment is higher or lower depends on the 
productivity in the low state compared to the intermediate state. If the productivity in the low 
state is too low, then the informed agent’s pay increases more than the uninformed agent’s pay 
because that payment is only tied to the productivity of the low state.  
Because agents work in a correlated environment, the information about the state of 
productivity is informative about the uninformed agent’s performance and therefore would be 
useful in contracting (Holmstrom, 1979; Demski, 2008; Baiman & Demski, 1980; Antle & 
Demski, 1988). A natural question then seems to be whether or not the information about 
productivity should be shared with the uninformed agent and if so how. I consider two 
possibilities for making the uninformed agent informed. First, the informed agent can report his 
information to the principal, who then makes the informed agent’s report public, sharing it with 
the uninformed agent before he chooses his action. Another option is that instead of 
communication to the principal, the informed agent can signal or indirectly communicate some of 
his information to the uninformed agent. The purpose is to understand whether it is always 
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beneficial to share information with the uninformed agent, and which type of communication, 
indirect or direct the principal prefers. The next section takes up these questions. 
3.2.2 Direct Information Sharing 
In this section, I consider information sharing with the uninformed agent in which the 
principal publicly releases the informed agent’s report before the agent takes his action. I also 
consider whether the principal prefers that both agents are uninformed rather than having one 
agent informed and whose information is shared via the pubic report. In a subsequent section, I 
consider indirect communication between the informed agent and the uninformed agent via the 
informed agent’s action, and then compare the two methods of making the uninformed agent 
informed. 
After receiving the informed agent’s information, the principal releases this information 
by making the informed agent’s information public and releasing a hard (i.e. verifiable) report 
prior to the agent’s choice of action. Then the previously uninformed agent is better informed 
about his productive choices. However, making the uniformed agent informed changes that 
agent’s incentives, which affects the payment. The principal must provide incentives for the agent 
to work hard given the information about the productive states. Therefore it is not clear whether 
or not the principal should make the informed agent’s information public.   
The principal’s problem for both agents with direct information sharing is as follows: 
Program PDirect 
Min
wi!0   
1
3






Inf (!ˆn ))+ pr(x j !H ;0,0)(wj
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For the informed agent, the solution is as above, when the informed agent directly 
communicated to the principal but the principal did not release the information to the uninformed 




, 0, 0). For the uninformed agent, the 




p1( p1! p0 )




, 0, 0), and expected cost is 1/3{ wH
Inf + 
p12 [ wH
UnInf (!ˆM )  + wH
Inf ] + q12 [ wH
UnInf (!ˆL ) + wH
Inf ]}.  
With the information communicated by the informed agent to the principal, the 
principal’s problem with the uninformed agent is the same as when the principal observes the 
productivity state directly. Thus, the payment to the uninformed agent is the same as the 
benchmark when the information is public, and there are no inefficiencies with the uninformed 
agent. However, just as above with no information sharing, the informed agent is overpaid and 
earns information rents in the high and intermediate state. Comparing the expected payment when 
information is made public to the expected payment when the information is not made public and 
to when both agents are uninformed yields the following result.  
Proposition 2: If one agent is informed and directly communicates to the principal, the principal 
will always prefer that the information be disclosed to the uninformed agent rather than not 








2 )y + q1( p1z + q1 y)
5(1+ p1
2 + q1
2 )y!q1( p1z + q1 y)
.* 
* where y  = p1 – p0, and z = q1 – q0. 
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With information sharing, communication is valuable because the principal can direct the 
uninformed agent’s actions and tailor his pay on the marginal productivity of the state, as reported 
by the informed agent. However, even with the benefit from communication, there are conditions 
under which the principal prefers that both agents are uninformed rather than allowing one agent 
to become informed and communicate and disclose that information. As in the previous section, 
the informed agent earns rents in the high and intermediate state and the principal will prefer that 
the informed agent is uninformed as long as the productivity in the low state is low enough 
compared to the productivity in the intermediate state. This is also true in this setting; however, 
the condition in Proposition 2 is stronger than the condition in Proposition 1 because of the 
savings from making the uninformed agent informed.  
Comparing expected payments state by state for the uniformed agent when the other 
agent is also uninformed to when the other agent is informed and that information is 
communicated and disclosed, demonstrates the tradeoffs of providing more information. In the 
high state θH, the uninformed agent works hard and is paid while with direct disclosures the agent 
does not work hard and is not paid, thus making the uninformed agent more costly. In the 
intermediate state, θM, the uninformed agent is also paid more than with direct disclosures, 
because the payment is based on the average marginal productivity, rather than based on the 
marginal productivity of the state. In the low state, θL, the uninformed agent may or may not be 
paid more than with direct disclosures, depending on if q1z/p1y >1/2. Overall, the benefit of 
making the agent informed outweighs the cost. 
In the next section I consider another method for sharing information with the 
uninformed agent, where the informed agent signals his information to the uninformed agent, 
rather than reporting it to the principal.  
3.2.3 Indirect Information Sharing  
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Next suppose that the information sharing occurs between the informed agent and the 
uninformed agent, rather than using the principal as a conduit.  I consider indirect communication 
rather than direct communication between the agents. While side-contracting and collusive 
agreements are precluded, direct communication between the agents is not barred, but such 
information is not credible, because the uninformed agent will ignore it.  So, the informed agent 
signals his information to the uninformed agent, rather than communicating to the principal who 
then publicly releases the informed agent’s report. First, only the informed agent observes θ and 
then chooses his level of effort, which the uninformed agent observes before choosing his own 
effort.  
I first start with the uninformed agent’s incentives, using backwards induction to solve 
the principal’s problem. Because the principal wants the agent to work hard in the states θM and 
θL, but not θH, I assume first that the contract to the informed agent provides these incentives. 
Given the contract and after observing the informed agent’s choice of action, the uninformed 
agent updates his beliefs about the signal that the informed agent received. If the uninformed 
agent observes the informed agent choosing low effort, the uninformed agent believes that the 
informed agent observed θH, where low effort is the preferred choice because the team will be 
successful regardless of effort. If the uninformed agent observes the informed agent working 
hard, then he believes that the informed agent observed either θM or θL, with each state equally 
likely.  
The principal then must provide incentives so that the uninformed agent’s strategy is to 
work hard only if he observes the informed agent working hard; otherwise he should want to 
choose low effort. The principal designs the uninformed agent’s incentive constraint to reflect the 
uninformed agent’s updated beliefs after observing the informed agent’s action. The uninformed 
agent’s expected payment is: .5{(1+ p12 + q12 ) wH
UnInf  + [2p1(1- p1) + 2q1(1- q1)] wM




Next, considering the informed agent’s incentives, given the uninformed agent’s strategy, 
the informed agent should want to work hard after observing either θM or θL, but not after 
observing θH. If the informed agent works hard the uninformed agent also works hard, but if the 
informed agent chooses low effort, then the uninformed agent will follow suit. This is a change 
from the normal team incentives, which ensure an agent will work hard given the other agent is 
also working. The principal designs the informed agent’s incentive constraints to ensure that the 
informed agent prefers to work hard only when he sees θM or θL. The principal’s problem with 
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The uninformed agent’s payment is found by the incentive constraint similar to when the 
informed agent did not signal his information. With a binding incentive constraint for the 
uninformed agent, the payments are wUnInf = (
 
2c
p1( p1! p0 )+ q1(q1!q0 )
, 0, 0). The informed 
agent’s payment is determined by the incentive constraints. Starting with the incentive constraint 
when the informed agent observes the low productivity state, θL, this incentive constraint must be 
binding, which implies that  wH






, and  wM
Inf  =  wL
Inf = 0. If the incentive constraint for 
state θM was binding, then the payment would be too low to induce the informed agent to work 
hard given the low state, θL. The optimal contract with indirect communication between the 
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agents is w Inf  = ( c(q12 ! q02 )
, 0, 0) and wUnInf = (
 
2c
p1( p1! p0 )+ q1(q1!q0 )
, 0, 0), and expected cost 
is = 
(1+ p12 + q12 )
3 (wH
Inf + wHUnInf ). 
Compared to the benchmark when the principal also observes the state, both agents’ 
productive efforts are efficient: both work hard in the low and intermediate states, but do not 
work hard in the high state. However, there are differences in the payments. The informed agent 
earns information rents in the high productivity state, and may earn rents in the intermediate state, 
depending on how the states of productivity vary. In the low productivity state, the informed 
agent’s pay is less than when information is public, because of the effect of the uniformed agent’s 
actions. If the informed agent works hard, then the uninformed agent also works hard, but if the 
informed agent does not work hard, then the uninformed agent also does not work hard. Because 
the uninformed agent’s payment is a weighted average of the two productive states, the 
uninformed agent is overpaid in the high and intermediate states, and underpaid in the low state.  
With no communication to the principal, signaling from the informed agent to the 
uninformed agent affects the incentives and the payments of both agents. The informed agent’s 
payment is less than an informed agent who does not signal his information to the uninformed 
agent. This is due to the effect of the uninformed agent’s actions on the informed agent’s actions. 
With the uninformed agent “following” the informed agent, the incentives the principal must 
provide are not as strong if the uninformed agent did not observe and follow the informed agent’s 
action After seeing the informed agent’s action, the now only partially uninformed agent only 
works hard in the two productive states, rather than in all three states when the agent was 
completely uninformed and this results in a payment that is less than the payment to a fully 
uninformed agent. The following proposition states the results concerning signaling and whether 
or not it is less costly for agents to be uninformed. 
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Proposition 3: If one agent is informed and information is shared via signaling, the principal will 
always prefer that the information be signaled to the uninformed agent rather than no 







(3q1 + 4q0 )
. 
where y = p1 – p0 and z = q1 – q0. 
Just like in the previous section where the informed agent’s information was disclosed to 
the uninformed agent, there are circumstances under which the principal prefers that both agents 
are uninformed. With lower productivity in the low state compared to productivity in the 
intermediate state, the informed agent’s payment is too high, even with signaling and even with 
the lower cost of the uninformed agent. Note that the condition above in Proposition 3, similar to 
the condition in Proposition 2, is also stronger than the condition in Proposition 1. This means 
that the benefits of information sharing, even indirectly, may be more difficult to overcome with 
uniformed agents. 
Next, I compare the two types of information sharing already analyzed: direct, which 
means the informed agent communicates to the principal, who discloses the information to the 
uninformed agent, and indirect, which means the informed agent does not communicate his 
information to the principal but partially signals his information to the uninformed agent via his 
productive action. With both direct and indirect information sharing, the principal always prefers 
information sharing to keeping the uninformed agent uninformed. Also with both indirect 
signaling and with the public release of information, the uninformed agent does not work hard 
when the state is θH, which means that in terms of productive efficiency, both types of 
information sharing improve the uninformed agent’s productive choices.  
Comparing the two types of information sharing involves only an analysis of payments to 
both the informed agent and the uninformed agent. With both indirect and direct information 
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sharing, the informed agent is paid in all three states. With indirect information sharing, because 
the informed agent signals his information, and because of the effect of the uninformed agent’s 
actions on his incentives, the payment is lower than with direct communication. So the benefit to 
signaling as a means of information sharing is due to the reduced cost of the informed agent. 
However, with the uninformed agent, whether there is a savings or not with signaling is unclear. 
With signaling, the uninformed agent is not fully informed, as he is with direct information 
sharing. However, lack of information does not necessarily result in a higher payment, as the 
previous results showed that sometimes the principal preferred to keep both agents uninformed.  
Whether or not the uninformed agent’s payment is less costly with signaling than with 
direct disclosure by the principal depends on how the productivity states vary. With signaling, the 
uninformed agent’s payment is a weighted average of productivity in the two productive states, 
while with direct disclosure, the payment is based on the actual marginal productivity of the state. 
A state-by-state analysis reveals the tradeoffs involved. In the high productivity state, with 
signaling the principal is unaware of the state and must pay the uninformed agent, while with 
direct disclosure, the uninformed agent is not paid a bonus because the principal is able to 
distinguish the states. In the intermediate state, the uninformed agent’s expected pay is more with 
signaling than with direct disclosure. Because the principal knows that the state is θM, he can pay 
the agent a reduced payment, while without knowing the state, with signaling the pay is based 
inversely on the average productivity, which is less than the actual marginal productivity. In the 
state θL, the situation reverses; with signaling, the expected payment is less than if the principal 
directly disclosed the information. Whether or not the uninformed agent’s overall expected pay 
with signaling is less than with direct disclosure thus depends on whether the savings in the state 
θL is big enough to overcome the cost in the other two states. 
The following proposition formally states the result concerning the optimal mode of 
information sharing with the uninformed agent. 
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Proposition 4: With one informed agent, the principal prefers signaling between the agents 











2 )(2q1 + q0 )y!( p1z + q1 y)q1(q1 + q0 )
.  
where y = p1 – p0 and z = q1 – q0. 
From the standpoint of the principal, neither method of information sharing dominates. 
The least costly method of information sharing when one agent is informed depends on the 
productivity in the low state being low enough compared to productivity in the intermediate state. 
This is similar to the previous results for conditions under which the principal prefers agents are 
uninformed. Signaling reduces the cost of the informed agent, and may reduce the cost of the 
uninformed agent. While disseminating information formally through the accounting system has 
benefits, including some not considered here, it is important to understand the benefits of other 
means of communicating information.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper studies incentives related to communication and information sharing in teams, 
where agents work in correlated environments, whose output is jointly determined, and who also 
are not identically informed about productivity. Whereas communication is not valuable on its 
own, it is valuable when that information is disclosed to the uninformed agent via a verifiable 
report from the principal. The paper also considers a less formal mode of information sharing, 
one where the informed agent signals his information to the uninformed agent through his action. 
The downside to signaling is that the principal remains uniformed and cannot tailor the 
uninformed agent’s payments to the actual state, but the advantage is that the informed agent’s 
payment is lower due to the effect of the uninformed agent’s actions. The principal may prefer 
indirect signaling to the public release, depending on how the states of productivity vary. 
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The model in this paper uses risk neutral agents in order to focus on incentives, while 
prior work on communication with single risk averse agents found benefits of communication in 
terms of better risk sharing. However, an improvement in risk sharing may be hampered in a team 
setting. With the joint team performance measure, individuals bear more risk than without teams. 
While this paper finds benefits in terms of incentives with communication of asymmetrically 
informed teams, an extension of this paper could study this tradeoff in terms of risk more closely. 
Several other extensions could include expanding the information system, or the tasks of 
the agents. In this paper, the information system provided a perfect pre-decision signal of 
productivity, and the performance measure was a perfect measure of the team’s output, and 
agent’s worked in a perfectly correlated environment. Considering error or bias in the signal, the 
performance measure and even an imperfectly correlated environment may have an impact on 
whether communication and information sharing are valuable. Finally, another extension could 
involve the endogenous acquisition of information, as in previous work (Demski Sappington, 
1987; Lambert, 1986). With asymmetric agents, acquiring information may very well depend on 
whether or not it is communicated to the principal and whether information is shared with the 
other uninformed agents. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: By observation, the contract with the informed agent does not depend on 
his information and it is not shared with the uninformed agent; therefore communication is not 
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Proof of Proposition 3: The proof consists of two parts.  
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Proof of Proposition 4: The principal will prefer signaling to direct disclosure if expected 
payments are lower, or if 
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